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A monetary model of heterogeneous households is constructed which deals in
a tractable way with the distribution of money balances across the population.
Only some households are on the receiving end of a money injection from the
central bank, and this in general produces price dispersion across markets.
This price dispersion generates uninsured consumption risk which is important
in determining the eﬀects of money growth, optimal policy, and the eﬀects of
money growth shocks. The optimal money growth rate can be very close to
zero, and the welfare cost of small inﬂations can be very large. Small money
shocks can have important sectoral eﬀects with small eﬀects on aggregates,
while large money shocks can have proportionately large eﬀects on aggregates.
11. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to construct a tractable model that takes seriously the
idea that the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy are important for macroeco-
nomic activity. We explore the qualitative and quantitative implications of this model
for the eﬀects of monetary policy on prices, output, consumption, and employment.
Models with distributional eﬀects of monetary policy are certainly not new. The
ﬁrst models of this type were the limited participation models constructed by Gross-
man and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), in which there are always some eco-
nomic agents who are not participating in ﬁnancial markets and will not receive the
ﬁrst-round eﬀects of an open market operation. In a limited participation model, a
monetary injection by the central bank causes a redistribution of wealth which will
in general cause short run changes in asset prices, employment, output, and the dis-
tribution of consumption across the population. The subsequent literature has to
a large extent focussed on asset pricing implications, particularly Lucas (1990), Al-
varez and Atkeson (1997), and Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002), in models that,
for tractability, ﬁnesse some of the potentially interesting distributional implications
of monetary policy.
Recent research in monetary theory is aimed at developing models of monetary
economies that capture heterogeneity and the distribution of wealth in a manner that
is tractable for analytical and quantitative work. One approach is to use a quasi-
linear utility function as in Lagos and Wright (2005), an approach that, under some
circumstances, will lead to the result that economic agents optimally redistribute
money balances uniformly among themselves whenever they have the opportunity.
Another approach is to use a representative household with many agents, as in Shi
(1997), in which (also see Lucas 1990) there can be redistributions of wealth within
the household during the period, but these distribution eﬀects do not persist. Work
2by Williamson (2005) and Shi (2004) uses the quasi-linear-utility and representative-
household approaches, respectively, to study some implications of limited participa-
tion for optimal monetary policy, interest rates, and output. Other related work is
Head and Shi (2003) and Chiu (2004).
In the model constructed in this paper, the existence of many-agent households
aids in allowing us to deal with the distribution of wealth in a tractable way, but
there is suﬃcient heterogeneity among households to permit some novel implications
for monetary policy. There is only one asset, ﬁat money, and the central bank in-
tervenes by making money transfers to households. These transfers are received by
some households, and not by others. A key feature of the model is that, in each pe-
riod, exchange occurs between members of households who received the transfer and
members of households who do not. That is, households are spatially separated, and
each period the agents from a household who purchase goods are dispersed to other
locations. In this way, a money injection by the central bank diﬀuses through the
economy over time, and in the limit there will be no distributional eﬀect of monetary
policy.
In equilibrium, prices are in general diﬀerent across locations. Since individual
agents are uncertain about where they will be buying goods, and there are no markets
on which to insure this risk, if there is dispersion in prices then this is an important
source of uncertainty for the household. With constant money growth, there will in
general be permanent price dispersion. From the point of view of the policymaker,
there are two key distortions. The ﬁrst is the standard monetary distortion - because
agents discount the future, with constant prices they will tend to hold too little real
money balances, and this distortion can be corrected through a deﬂation that gives
money an appropriately high real rate of return. The second is the relative price
distortion - in the model, if the money supply is growing or shrinking then price
dispersion exists and agents face consumption risk. The second distortion can be
3corrected if the money supply is constant, which implies constant prices in the model.
The optimal money growth rate is therefore negative, but at the optimum the nominal
interest rate is greater than zero. That is, a Friedman rule is not optimal here. This
is a key result, as the Friedman rule is probably the most ubiquitous of properties
of monetary models. Some numerical experiments show that there are circumstances
where the optimal money growth rate is very close to zero, so that the welfare loss
from having a constant money supply is extremely small. The welfare loss from a
moderate inﬂation depends on parameter values, but we show examples of moderate
inﬂations that yield welfare costs of inﬂation that are an order of magnitude higher
than those typically found in the literature, even with levels of risk aversion that are
moderate.
To illustrate the dynamic eﬀects of central bank money injections, we study a sto-
chastic version of the model. Even i.i.d. money shocks yield persistent eﬀects on
output, employment, and the nominal interest rate. This persistence depends criti-
cally on parameters governing the speed of diﬀusion of money through the economy
and the degree of ﬁnancial connnectedness. Numerical examples show that monetary
shocks can be quantitatively important, particularly for the distribution of consump-
tion across the population and for the determination of the nominal interest rate.
In Section 2 we construct the model, while in Sections 3 and 4 we study the eﬀects
of constant money growth and stochastic money growth, respectively. Section 5 is a
conclusion.
2. THE MODEL
There is a continuum of islands with unit mass indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each island
has a double inﬁnity of locations indexed by j = −∞,...,−1,0,1,...,∞. At each loca-
tion there is an inﬁnitely-lived household, consisting of a producer and a continuum
of consumers, with the continuum of consumers having unit mass. Consumers are
















where t indexes time, 0 <β<1,c
ij
t (k) is the consumption of consumer k who is
a member of the household living at location j on island i, n
ij
t is the labor supply
of the producer who is a member of the household living at location j on island i,
and λ(·) denotes the measure of consumers in the household. Assume that u(·) is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave, with u0(0) = ∞. Also suppose
that v(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly convex, with v0(0) = 0 and
v0(∞)=∞. T h ep r o d u c e rc a ns u p p l ya nu n l i m i t e dq u a n t i t yo fl a b o r ,a n de a c hu n i t
of labor supplied yields one unit of the perishable consumption good.
There is a fraction α of connected islands, where 0 <α<1. At the beginning
of the period, the household at location j on island i has m
ij
t units of divisible ﬁat
money. All of the households on connected islands then receive an identical money
transfer Υt from the central bank. Households on islands that are not connected never
receive transfers. After receiving transfers, each consumer in the household receives
a location shock. There is a probability π that a consumer stays on the same island,
and a probability 1 − π that the consumer is randomly relocated to another island.
We will assume that each consumer acts to maximize his or her own consumption.
The location shock of an individual consumer is unobservable to the other members
of the household, as is the consumer’s consumption quantity. Also assume that the
household is not able to keep records from period to period on observable actions by
consumers.1
On each island there is an absence-of-double-coincidence problem. That is, con-
sumers from a household j desire the consumption good produced by household j+1.
1If we allow record-keeping by the household, then intertemporal incentives could potentially be
used to induce truthful reporting of location shocks to the household.
5The same applies to consumers who change islands. That is, a consumer from location
j on his or her home island desires the consumption goods produced by the producer
at location j +1at the island to which he or she is relocated.
After receiving their location shocks, consumers are allocated money by the house-
hold, and they then go shopping at other locations. While consumers shop for goods,
producers remain at home and sell goods to consumers arriving from other locations.
When consumers purchase consumption goods, these goods must be consumed on the
spot, and the consumers then return to their home locations. Thus, the household’s
consumers cannot share risk by returning to their home location and pooling their
consumption goods, even if they wished to do so. Communication among locations
and record-keeping are limited, so that consumption goods must be purchased with
money. Thus, consumers face cash-in-advance constraints.
T h ek e yf e a t u r e so ft h em o d e la r et h a tg o o d sm u s tb ep u r c h a s e dw i t hm o n e y ,
that money injections and withdrawals by the central bank will alter the distribution
of money balances across the population, and consumption goods cannot be moved
between locations.
3. CONSTANT MONEY GROWTH
In this section, we will ﬁrst characterize an equilibrium where the money stock
grows at a constant rate. Then, we determine the eﬀects of changes in the money
growth rate on employment, output, consumption and prices across locations. Next,
we will draw some general conclusions about the optimal money growth rate, followed
by some numerical examples.
Consumers from a given household who ﬁnd themselves at diﬀerent locations will in
general face diﬀerent prices for consumption goods. In the equilibria we study, prices
will be identical on all connected islands and on all unconnected islands. Then, let p1t
(p2t) denote the price of goods in terms of money on connected (unconnected) islands.
6If the household could observe where consumers were to be located when it makes
its decision about how to distribute household money balances among consumers, it
would in general want to give diﬀerent agents diﬀerent money allocations. However,
since each consumer wishes to maximize his or her own consumption, and because
there is no record-keeping which might permit intertemporal incentive schemes, each
consumer will report the location shock to the household that implies the largest
money allocation. It is therefore optimal for the household to allocate the same
quantity of money to each consumer, as any randomness in money allocations must
reduce the expected utility of the household.
A household on a connected island has m1t units of money balances at the beginning
of period t, and receives a nominal transfer Υt. We will also suppose that households
on connected islands can trade at the beginning of the period on a bond market. Each
bond sells for qt units of money in period t and is a claim to one unit of money in period
t +1 . Households on unconnected islands do not have access to a communications
technology that allows them to trade bonds. Further, bonds cannot be traded for
goods as it is costless to produce counterfeit bonds that are indistinguishable from
g e n u i n eb o n d st ot h ea g e n t ss e l l i n gg o o d s .
Letting ˆ m1t denote the quantity of money allocated by the a household on a con-
nected island to each consumer, and let bt denote the nominal bonds acquired by the
household that mature in period t. Then, the household faces the cash-in-advance
constraint
qtbt+1 +ˆ m1t ≤ m1t + Υt + bt (2)
When relocation shocks are realized for a household on a connected island, 1−(1−α)π
consumers in the household go to connected islands, with each consuming c11
t goods
which are purchased at the price p1t. As well, (1−α)π consumers go to unconnected
islands and consume c12
t goods purchased at the price p2t. As each consumer wishes





t =ˆ m1t (3)
The producer remains at the home location, supplying n1t units of labor to produce
n1t consumption goods, which are then sold at the price p1t. The household enters
period t +1with m1,t+1 units of money. The household’s budget constraint is then
qtbt+1 +ˆ m1t + m1,t+1 = p1tn1t + m1t + Υt + bt. (4)
Similarly, a household on a unconnected island begins period t with m2t units of
money, and allocates ˆ m2t units of money to each consumer in the household. Given
that a household on an unconnected island does not have access to the bond market
and receives no transfer from the government, its cash-in-advance constraint is
ˆ m2t ≤ m2t. (5)
After receiving location shocks, απ consumers from the household each arrive at
connected islands and consume c21
t consumption goods each, while 1−απ consumers
travel to unconnected islands, with each consuming c22
t .E a c h c o n s u m e r s p e n d s h i s





t =ˆ m2t (6)
For a household on a unconnected island, the budget constraint is
ˆ m2t + m2,t+1 = p2tn2t + m2t, (7)
or money balances allocated to the household’s consumers plus end-of-period money
balances equals total receipts from sales of goods plus beginning-of-period money
balances.
8From (1) and (??)-(7), the ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimum for connected and

























That is, each household supplies labor each period to produce consumption goods,
which it sells for money. The money is then spent in the following period for con-
sumption goods at connected and unconnected islands. Thus, in equations (8) and
(9) at the optimum each household equates the current marginal disutility of labor
with the discounted expectation of the gross real rate of return on money weighted
by the marginal utility of consumption in the forthcoming period.
The bond price qt is determined, from (1) and (??)-(7) and the ﬁrst-order conditions
for an optimum by
−qt
©
[1 − (1 − α)π]u
0(c
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In all of the equilibria we examine, the cash-in-advance constraints (2) and (5) hold
with equality. As well, in the symmetric equilibria that we study, we will have bt =0
for all t. Then, since each household always spends all of its money on consumption
goods, the path for the money stock at each location is exogenous. In period t, let M1t
denote the supply of money per household on each connected island after the transfer
from the central bank, and let M2t denote the supply of money per household on each
unconnected island. At a location on a connected island, during period t there will
be a total of 1 − (1 − α)π agents who will arrive from connected islands, and each
these agents will spend M1t units of money in exchange for goods, while (1 − α)π
agents will arrive from unconnected islands and will spend M2t units of money each.
Similarly, at a location on an unconnected island, 1−απ agents will arrive from other
9unconnected islands, with each of these agents spending M2t units of money, and
M1t units of money will be spent by each of the απ agents arriving from connected
islands. Therefore, the stocks of money per household at connected and unconnected
locations evolve according to
M1,t+1 =[ 1− (1 − α)π]M1t +( 1− α)πM2t + Υt+1, (11)
M2,t+1 = απM1t +( 1− απ)M2t. (12)
Note that π will govern how quickly a money injection by the central bank becomes
diﬀused through the economy. If π =1 , in which case all consumers are relocated
to another island, then from (11) and (12) the same quantity of money is spent in
all locations in each period, so that diﬀusion occurs in one period. If π =0then
M2t = M20 for all t and M1t is governed entirely by the history of central bank
transfers and does not depend on α.
The remaining equilibrium conditions are
p1tn1t =[ 1− (1 − α)π]M1t +( 1− α)πM2t, (13)
p2tn2t = απM1t +( 1− απ)M2t, (14)
or money demand equals money supply on connected and unconnected islands, re-
spectively. Then, substituting in (8) and (9) for consumption and prices using (2),
(3), (5), and (6) (with equality for (2) and (5)), (13), and (14), we get
−
v0(n1t)n1t























































An equilibrium is then a sequence {n1t,n 2t}
∞
t=0 that solves (15) and (16) for t =
0,1,2,..., with {M1t,M 2t}
∞
t=0 determined by (11) and (12), given M10, M20, and
{Υt}∞
t=0. Then equilibrium prices can be determined from (13) and (14), and con-























[1 − (1 − α)π]M1t +( 1− α)πM2t
. (20)




[1 − (1 − α)π]u0(c11































Since the distribution of money balances across islands matters in this model, not
every monetary policy rule with a constant growth rate for the aggregate money stock
will yield an equilibrium that is straightforward to analyze. From (15) and (16) a
money growth policy that will yield an equilibrium where nit is constant for all t, for
i =1 ,2, is one where Mit grows at a constant gross rate µ for each i =1 ,2. Given
11this policy, if we deﬁne δ to be the ratio of the per-capita money stocks on connected





then clearly, δ must be constant for all t. Therefore, from (11) and (12), and again






απM1t +( 1− απ)M2t
,





That is, to implement a monetary policy where the aggregate money stock and per-
capita money stocks in all locations grow at the same gross rate µ, the monetary
authority must set the transfer in period 0 so that the ratio of per-capita money
stocks on connected and unconnected islands conforms to (23), and then transfers
are made in each succeeding period so that the money stock on connected islands
grows at the gross rate µ. Thus, if the money supply growth rate is positive (µ>1)
then from (23) there will be a higher quantity of money per capita at each date on
connected islands than on unconnected islands, and vice-versa if µ<1.
Given this constant money growth policy, there exists an equilibrium where labor
supply, output, and consumption for each type of consumer are constant for all time
in each location. Letting n1 and n2 denote labor supply by a household on a connected



















































































(µ − 1)[1 − (1 − α)π]+απ
. (29)





From (24)-(29), if the money supply is ﬁxed for all t (µ =1 ) , which implies that
δ =1from (23), so that the distribution of money balances across the population is






and consumption is n∗ for all agents in each period. However if µ 6=1then con-
sumption will be diﬀerent for consumers who purchase goods at a particular location,
depending on their home location, and consumption will also diﬀer for consumers
from a given location depending on where they purchase goods. Thus, if the money
supply is not constant, then agents face uninsured consumption risk. A higher money
growth rate implies, from (26)-(29), that consumers from households located on con-
nected islands consume larger shares of output, and consumers from unconnected
islands consume smaller shares. As µ →∞ , connected-island households consume all
output.
We can derive the eﬀect of a change in the money growth factor µ on n1 and n2, at
least for µ =1 . That is, totally diﬀerentiating (24) and (25) and evaluating derivatives
















































In general, we cannot sign dn1
dµ and dn2
dµ , though dn2
dµ < 0 if the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is less than 1 (the substitution eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee ﬀective real
wage dominates the income eﬀect). A key result is that an increase in the money
growth rate when µ =1will reduce aggregate labor supply and output. That is, from

















W eg e tt h i sr e s u l tf o rt h es t a n d a r dr e a s o n-i n ﬂation is a tax on labor supply, and
thus higher inﬂation tends to reduce employment and output.
Optimal Money Growth
There are two distortions that arise here. The ﬁrst is a standard monetary dis-
tortion; that is, with a ﬁxed money supply and discounting, the rate of return on
money tends to be too low and less labor is supplied than is optimal. Second, con-
sumption will diﬀer among agents if µ 6=1 . For example, if µ>1 then the price of
consumption goods will tend to be higher on c o n n e c t e dt h a no nu n c onnected islands,
so that consumers who purchase goods on connected islands will tend to consume less
14than those who purchase on unconnected islands. Further, if µ>1 then consumers
from connected islands will have more money than will consumers from unconnected
islands, and so the former set of consumers will be able to purchase more goods at a
given location. The reverse is true if µ<1. While the ﬁrst distortion will induce a
beneﬁtf r o md e ﬂation, the second distortion will induce costs of a non-constant money
supply. As we will show in what follows, this implies that a small amount of deﬂation
is optimal, but deﬂation at the rate of time preference (µ = β) is either infeasible or
suboptimal. These results are similar in ﬂavor to what holds in sticky price models,
but of course prices are perfectly ﬂexible here; the key frictions are that monetary
policy has distributional eﬀects and goods cannot be moved across locations.
Now, suppose that we look for an optimal monetary growth rule in the class of
constant growth polices with constant δ as in (23). In the equilibrium we study, the
cash-in-advance constraints bind if and only if q ≤ 1, or, from (30), if and only if
µ ≥ β. If we weight expected utilities of households equally, then the optimal money
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α[1 − (1 − α)π]u(c11
t )+α(1 − α)πu(c12
t )
+(1 − α)(1 − απ)u(c22
t )+( 1− α)απu(c21
t )
−αv(n1) − (1 − α)v(n2)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
. (35)
A non-standard restriction, which arises from the requirement that consumption be
nonnegative for all agents is, from (26)-(29),
µ>1 − απ.
This constraint implies that there are circumstances under which a Friedman rule is
not feasible. That is, if
β ≤ 1 − απ, (36)
then an equilibrium does not exist when µ = β.Thus, if (36) holds, then in the class of
equilibria we examine, the only ones that exist have strictly positive nominal interest
15rates. The possibility of an infeasible Friedman rule arises because, if απ is suﬃciently
small, then the taxes required to support a Friedman rule deﬂation would be greater
than the money balances that households on connected islands have available at the
beginning of the period.
Now, if we diﬀerentiate (35) using (26)-(29) and evaluate the derivative for µ =1 ,
we obtain
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where A is the eﬀect of a change in µ on welfare caused by the increase in consump-
tion risk arising from the redistribution of consumption goods among agents. The
remaining portion of the change in welfare is the net eﬀe c to nw e l f a r eo ft h ec h a n g ei n
labor supply resulting from a change in µ. It is straightforward to show that A =0 ,
that is since consumption is equal across agents when µ =1 , the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of
ac h a n g ei nµ on consumption risk is nil. Therefore, the net eﬀect on welfare when
µ =1is determined by the eﬀe c to na g g r e g a t eo u t p u t ,w h ich from (34) is negative.
Therefore, a small reduction in the money growth rate from zero will increase welfare.
Numerical Exercises
Solutions can be computed by using (24) and (25) to solve for n1 and n2 given
µ, and then we can solve for consumptions and welfare from (26)-(29) and (35). For
now, we use somewhat arbitrary parameter values to obtain a feel for the quantitative
results the model can deliver.
We let u(c)=c1−γ−1
1−γ , with γ>0 and v(n)=n. To begin, let β = .99, and
α = π = .5. Figures 1-3 show results for diﬀerent levels of risk aversion, since curvature
in the utility function will be critical to determining the eﬀects of money growth,
which has important eﬀects on consumption risk. In Figure 1, we graph welfare
relative to optimal money growth, measured in units of consumption relative to what
16is achieved with an optimal money growth rate, for diﬀerent levels of the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion. Note that the optimal money growth rate increases with the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and that for a fairly moderate level of risk aversion
(CRRA =2 )a ﬁxed money supply is very close to optimal. That is, it does not take
a high degree of risk aversion for consumption risk to become the dominant force in
determining optimal monetary policy. Higher risk aversion of course also increases
the welfare costs of deviations from the optimal money growth rate. In Figure 2 we
show the same picture as in Figure 1, but we include higher levels for the money
growth rate. With CRRA = .5, the welfare loss from a 10% per period inﬂation is
somewhat more than 1% of consumption, but this number increases to more than 7%
of consumption for CRRA =3 , a cost which is very large relative to what is typically
obtained in the literature. The welfare cost of inﬂation also depends critically on
α and π. The larger is α, t h el o w e ri st h ec o s to fi n ﬂation. Note in particular that
α =1gives us a standard cash-in-advance model. Since π determines the speed of
diﬀusion of a money injection through the economy, higher π will imply a lower cost
of inﬂation. Figure 3 shows how money growth aﬀects consumption risk. Note, for
example, that for a 1% money growth rate, there is a very large diﬀerence between
the consumption of agents who move from a connected to unconnected island (c12),
and those who move from an unconnected to a connected island (c21).
In the experiments studied here, the optimal money growth rate factor is always
greater than the discount factor, that is µ>β .F r o m( 3 0 ) ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tq<1
and the nominal interest rate is strictly positive at the optimum. In other words, a
Friedman rule is in general suboptimal.








































































































4. STOCHASTIC MONEY GROWTH
The previous section tells us something about optimal monetary policy, in the class
of policies that yield the same consumption and employment allocation in each period.
We have also learned something about the costs of suboptimal money growth rates.
The purpose of this section is to study the eﬀects of suboptimal random monetary
policy. We compute equilibria for cases where the money growth rate is random, and
study the impulse responses to money growth shocks.
Assume that the gross money growth rate µ follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process,
and as before let δ denote the ratio of per capita money balances on connected islands
to per capita money balances on unconnected islands. Then, the state is described
by (µ,δ), and assuming that cash-in-advance constraints hold with equality, the law
of motion for δ is, using (11), (12), and (22),
δ
0 =
α[µ0 − (1 − α)π]δ +( 1− α)(µ0 − 1+απ)
α2πδ + α(1 − απ)
, (37)
where primes denote variables dated t +1 . Therefore, if the household spends all of
its cash balances on consumption goods each period, then the stochastic process for δ
19is exogenous, which makes computing equilibria relatively straightforward. It is clear
from (37) that there is persistence in δ, due to the fact that it takes time for a money







in which case the distribution of money balances across the population is determined
only by the current money growth rate, and there is no persistence.
In this environment, the ﬁrst-order conditions from the optimization problems of




























where F(µ0;µ) is the distribution of µ0 conditional on µ. Let ni(δ,µ) denote the level of
employment in state (δ,µ), where i =1denotes a connected island and i =2denotes
an unconnected island. Then, substituting in (38) and (39) using the equilibrium













































































[1 − (1 − α)π]δ +( 1− α)π
. (45)
In (40) and (41) δ




1 − (1 − α)π
α
{α[µ
0 − (1 − α)π]δ +( 1− α)(µ − 1+απ)}
+(1 − α)π(απδ +1− απ),
φ2(µ
0,δ) ≡ π{α[µ
0 − (1 − α)π]δ +( 1− α)(µ − 1+απ)}
+(1 − απ)(απδ +1− απ),















































In these experiments, we will examine the impulse responses to money growth
shocks so as to obtain some sense of the quantitative operating characteristics of the
21model. As with the constant-money-growth experiments, we use u(c)=c1−γ−1
1−γ , with
γ>0 and v(n)=n. We set β = .99 and γ =1 .5. As well, we will look only at
examples where money growth shocks are i.i.d., as in this case there would be no
eﬀect of a money shock on employment, output, and consumption in the special case
where there are no distribution eﬀects (α =1 ) . In this case, all of the persistence in
the eﬀects of money shocks will come from persistent eﬀects on the distribution of
money balances across the population.
Two critical parameters in the model are α, the fraction of agents living on con-
nected islands, and π, which governs the degree of persistence in the distributional
eﬀect of a money growth shock. We will conduct three experiments, which are de-
signed to tell us something about sensitivity to α and π. For all three experiments,
we assume a uniform grid for the money growth factor µ over the interval [1.03,1.05],
with equal probability mass on each grid point. Thus, the mean money growth rate
is 4% per period in the experiments.2 I nt h ee x p e r i m e n t sw es u p p o s et h a tt h em o n e y
growth rate has been at 4% for a long period of time, and then study the impulse re-
sponses when the money growth rate increases to 5% for one period, and then returns
to 4% forever.
For the ﬁrst experiment, set α = .5 and π = .3. The impulse responses are in Figures
4 - 6 ,w h e r ew es h o wt h er a t i o st ot h eb a s e l i n ec a s ef o re m p l o y m e n ta n dc o n s u m p t i o n
in Figures 4 and 5 and the diﬀerence from the baseline case for the nominal interest
rate in Figure 6. In Figure 4, note that employment rises in response to the money
growth shock on unconnected islands and decreases on connected islands, with total
employment increasing. In this experiment, the wealth eﬀects of the money injection
dominate. Wealth increases for households on connected islands while it decreases for
agents on unconnected islands, so that the connected-island households work less and
2This guarantees that cash-in-advance constraints are always binding in each of the three exper-
iments.
22the unconnected island households work more. For all three employment quantities,
the eﬀects are quite small. However, this is not the case for consumption quantities,
as in Figure 5 the money shock is shown to increase substantially the dispersion
in consumption across agents. The increase in consumption is particularly large for
consumers who live on a connected island and buy at a low price with a large quantity
of money on an unconnected island. Similarly, the decrease in consumption is large
for a consumer living on an unconnected island who must buy at a high price with a
low quantity of money on a connected island. In Figure 6, the money shock produces
a liquidity eﬀect, with the increase in the money growth rate of 1% producing a
decrease of about 30 basis points in the nominal interest rate on impact. Note also
that the liquidity eﬀect is persistent.
The decline in the nominal interest rate in response to a positive money shock
occurs due to both a Fisher eﬀe c ta n da ne ﬀect on the real interest rate. On connected
islands, the price level will decline relative to the baseline case following the money
shock, so deﬂation is anticipated and the Fisher eﬀect acts to reduce the nominal
interest rate. As well, households on connected islands expect their consumption to
be falling over time following the money shock, and so the real interest rate will also
be lower than if the money shock had not occurred.
In the second experiment, we concentrate the money injection on fewer agents, set-
ting α = .1 and π = .3. In this case, the results are shown in Figures 7-9, which should
be compared to Figures 4-6. In Figure 4, note that the employment responses are
somewhat larger, though still small, and that employment in all locations increases,
in spite of the negative eﬀect of the increase in wealth on employment on connected
islands. This is likely due to the fact that, with α small, the increase in consumption
dispersion produced by the money shock is larger, as shown in Figure 8. As a result,
the money shock produces more consumption uncertainty for all households, and this








Figure 4: alpha=.5, pie=.3




























Figure 5: alpha=.5, pie=.3


























Figure 6: alpha=.5, pie=.3




























appears to be producing higher labor supply for everyone, in a manner much like a
precautionary savings eﬀect. In Figure 9, note that the liquidity eﬀect is now larger
than before, as each household on connected islands now receives a larger money in-
jection given that we are holding constant the shock to the aggregate money growth
rate.
In the third experiment, the money growth shock is less persistent, relative to the
ﬁrst experiment. The results are shown in Figures 10-12, which should be compared
to Figures 4-6. Note in Figures 10 and 11 that the impact eﬀects of the money shock
on employment and consumption are similar, but the eﬀects are less persistent as
money is now diﬀused at a higher rate through the economy. Because of this more
rapid diﬀusion, Figure 12 shows a larger liquidity eﬀect on impact.





Figure 7: alpha=.1, pie=.3



























Figure 8: alpha=.1, pie=.3





















Figure 9: alpha=.1, pie=.3





































Figure 10: alpha=.5, pie=.5























Figure 11: alpha=.5, pie=.5


























Figure 12: alpha=.5, pie=.5





























We have constructed a model of heterogeneous households that captures some novel
distributional eﬀects of monetary policy. In the model, some households ﬁnd them-
selves on the receiving end of a money injection by the central bank, and some do
not. In general there will be price dispersion across markets generated by monetary
policy, and as a result monetary policy can produce uninsured consumption risk. This
consumption risk is important in determining optimal money growth rates and aﬀects
the response of the economy to aggregate money shocks.
We showed that, for moderate levels of risk aversion, a constant money stock could
be very close to optimal, and the welfare cost of a small inﬂation could be very
large. In the experiments we conducted, money growth shocks have small eﬀects
on aggregate employment and large eﬀects on the dispersion in consumption. There
are potentially large and persistent liquidity eﬀects, with the nominal interest rate
declining in response to a positive money growth shock, even when money growth
shocks are i.i.d.
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